Shivshankar Menon: 'Pakistan's
Insider Threat Is Serious'
March 27, 2026
'Pakistan's is the only
military-controlled nuclear weapons programme in the world.'
'As people get radicalised, the risk of a brigadier or pilot taking matters
into their own hands is a real concern.'
Key Points
·
Nuclear weapons are meant to prevent use, coercion, or blackmail
-- not for battlefield advantage.
·
The decision to maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing has
been driven primarily by scientific confidence rather than international
pressure.
·
A critical distinction in India's thinking lies between its own
strategic systems and the destabilising nature of tactical nuclear weapons.
Shivshankar Menon has had a distinguished career
in the Indian Foreign Service -- as ambassador to Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Israel
and China.
He was foreign secretary and later
national security advisor to the government of India. He has had a long
association with the Indian nuclear programme.
"There is a dangerous frivolity
in public discourse now, with people saying 'nuke them' without understanding
that you cannot contain the effects within a neighbor's boundaries,"
Ambassador Menon tells Shivanand Kanavi in the concluding
segment of a two-part interview:
On the doctrine, India and China are
the only two countries with a declared No First Use (NFU) policy.
What was the logic behind ours?
We stated that our arsenal is
primarily to prevent nuclear threats, blackmail, or use against us. We are not
going to use it to compensate for conventional inferiority or against
asymmetric threats like terrorism. It's meant for other nuclear weapon states.
Therefore, No First Use makes sense.
It indicates our posture and the circumstances under which we would use them.
Since we have been subjected to nuclear threats -- like the USS
Enterprise in 1971 -- the weapons are to deal with that.
The doctrine is a logical whole; if
you change one bit, like NFU, you have to change the posture and force
structure. However we keep it under review.
What about the moratorium on testing?
Was that based on scientific advice or international acceptability?
It was based on scientific advice
that we could further develop the programme without testing. When it comes to
national security, you can't base your decision on what other countries like.
The moratorium was not part of the
nuclear deal with US. It was a unilateral declaration we reiterated. The US has
a policy to cease cooperation if we test, and we have the right to test if our
national security requires it.
The deal was structured to ensure
fuel supply and reprocessing rights to prevent a repeat of the Tarapur
situation.
On the admission of India into
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG): Now that we have a waiver, do we really need to
become a member?
Frankly, I don't see any big gain
from membership apart from an ego boost. The waiver gives us a license to
cooperate with anyone who wants to cooperate with us. That's all we need.
If we want to export reactors, we are
free to do so under our own restrictive policy.
Chasing NSG membership, especially
when China is blocking it, gives them a lever and doesn't suit us.
It makes no sense. We should engage,
be a player in nuclear commerce, and these things may follow. Chasing status is
the wrong way around.
One issue that is often discussed is about Pakistani tactical nuclear weapons and thereby decentralising command and control. Doesn't that same logic apply to our nuclear submarines?
Obviously, on a submarine, the weapons are either mated or not.
It is a more complicated problem than with land-based or air-delivered weapons,
but it is a problem that other countries have solved with technical means.
There
will still be central command and control. There are protocols and technical
fixes to ensure this.
While no one can give a 100% guarantee, every possible measure
is taken to prevent anything from going wrong. For me, that provides a very
high level of assurance.
Tactical weapons are a different and more destabilising problem
because command and control often has to be delegated to a much lower level,
especially if you're talking about nuclear artillery shells.
This is particularly dangerous in our situation, where launch
warning times are very short and we lack a robust early warning system.
Our reliance must be on deterrence and other means'
This leads to the issue of ballistic missile defence (BMD). With
Pakistan, the ranges are so short that a 100% effective BMD seems impossible.
That's correct. At these ranges, there is no foolproof ballistic
missile defence. Therefore, our reliance must be on deterrence and other means.
There is a dangerous frivolity in public discourse now, with
people saying 'nuke them' without understanding that you cannot contain the
effects within a neighbor's boundaries.
People need to be educated so that these weapons are not talked
about lightly.
On India's command and control structure, has it been published?
Who has the authority to order a launch?
The broad structure is known. There is a Nuclear Command
Authority with a political council, chaired by the prime minister. But I don't
know how much of the detailed procedure has been or should be published.
The idea of a 'button' is a popular simplification. The reality
is a rigorous process designed to prevent any madman from starting a nuclear
war.
In Pakistan, however, the insider threat is serious. It is the
only military-controlled nuclear weapons programme in the world.
The Strategic Plans Division controls everything. As people get
radicalised, the risk of a brigadier or pilot taking matters into their own
hands is a real concern.
There's a technical debate about our thermonuclear test in 1998, with scientists like P K Iyengar and others claiming it was not a full success.
How does one reconcile
that with the official statement?
There is a point beyond which this debate is like asking how
many angels can dance on the head of a pin. The relevant question is not about
the exact yield of one test in a series, but about credible and effective
deterrence.
Do we have workable, deliverable weapons that create a credible
deterrent? The scientific establishment that is responsible for the programme,
from Dr R Chidambaram to Dr Anil Kakodkar, has been clear that we do.
We must be wary of getting into an arms race or pursuing
overkill. We have resource constraints.
Our doctrine is based on assured retaliation, not on matching
other countries warhead for warhead or megaton for megaton. The goal is
deterrence, and that has been achieved.
Feature Presentation:
Aslam Hunani/Rediff
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